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This issue of the European journal of International Law contains three wonderful, exemplary 
articles on, roughly, international law-making. Danae Azaria makes the careful argument that the 
International Law Commission (ILC) has become entrusted (and justifiably so, she suggests) with 
the task of authoritatively interpreting international law. Kristina Daugirdas demonstrates that 
customary international law cannot only be made by states, but also by international 
organizations, therewith throwing new light on a topic that has remained in the shadows for all 
too long perhaps. And Orfeas Chasapis Tassinis subtly and with sophistication argues that 
interpretation is not a process limited to written texts but, in the context of international law, also 
governs the formation and identification of customary international law. All three papers make 
valuable contributions to our understanding, and all three authors make a plausible case for their 
positions.  
And yet, something does not quite seem right: there is a sense that the papers are barking up the 
wrong tree - are engaged in discussions that are no longer quite as central to international law as 
they may once have been. What is more (and this may be related), the three papers all seem to 
operate in a political vacuum, presupposing that the making of international law can be reduced 
to a technical exercise, informed at best by analytical-philosophical considerations but without any 
concern for political concepts such as legitimation, democracy, representation, or accountability. 
It is questionable whether such an approach can inform more “technical” questions (assuming this 
is a meaningful category to begin with), but with respect to the making of law – a quintessentially 
political affair – doctrine is at its best when it steps out of its own vacuum. 
In what follows I will aim to sketch my concerns, thinking of law-making in terms of the exercise 
and reception of authority (section II) and the distribution of costs and benefits accompanying all 
legal decision-making and institution-building (section III), before commenting in somewhat 
greater detail on the papers by Azaria, Daugirdas and Chasapis Tassinis (section IV). Section V 
concludes.  
 
II. Global Governance: The Exercise and Reception of Authority 
 
From the early 1990s until the 2010s, the words “global governance” were on everyone’s lips – 
well, everyone with an interest in international affairs, that is. James Rosenau was among the first 
to observe that governance could be exercised without a duly appointed government.2 Craig 
Murphy suggested much the same in his excellent study of the role of international organizations 
                                                        
1 University of Helsinki. jan.klabbers@helsinki.fi 
2 J. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (eds), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (1992). 
 
 
as the pivots around which telecommunications revolutions revolved,3 and it soon transpired that 
the concept could even inspire the establishment of a new journal, and a meaningful one at that.4 
Global governance may have been someone’s political project, a companion ideology to help 
justify and legitimize globalization,5 but it was also immediately recognized to be more than that – 
both a mode of exercising authority and a perspective on the use of authority in international 
affairs.6 For, it became clear, authority was exercised in a wide variety of ways and by a wide 
variety of actors and, what is more, was increasingly exercised directly over a wide variety of 
subjects. The state, or so it seemed, was bypassed from all angles: no longer sole law-maker, no 
longer sole law-recipient. A new world order was in the making, or had possibly already arrived.7 
None of this was exactly novel in the 1990s, except for the label “global governance”. Once the 
ontological reality of international organizations had come to be accepted, after some hesitant 
beginnings,8 following the ICJ’s milestone opinion in Reparation for Injuries9 a lively debate broke 
out over the subjects of international law – a debate that continues to this day.10 Law-making, in 
turn, was mulled over from the 1950s onwards,11 focusing on whether there could be memoranda 
of understanding and if so, whether these have legal effect,12 and this debate soon came to be 
accompanied by further debates involving clever new labels: not just “instant custom”,13 but also, 
and more prominently still, “soft law”.14 And at the other end concepts such as jus cogens and 
erga omnes obligations emerged,15 suggesting again – if from a different vantage point - that 
authority was exercised in different ways than had traditionally been the case, something later 
captured in the thought that international law was constitutionalizing.16 It was clear that law-
making no longer solely followed the traditional route of sovereign states solemnly gathering, 
making sure their minds would meet, and laying down the results in the form of a legally binding 
agreement which, whatever its designation, would be a treaty. It was clear that authority came in 
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all sorts of manifestations, an “infinite variety”17 of all sorts of “twilight”18 instruments existing on 
the “legally subliminal level”,19 and sometimes also proper treaties containing strong elements of 
“noncommitment in the commitment”, as Glennon memorably referred to Article 5 NATO.20 
In retrospect, possibly the most fundamental development was, paradoxically perhaps, widely 
discussed but rarely seen for what it was: the emergence of the individual as the direct recipient 
of international law. And perhaps this was so because the discipline of international law, or law 
generally, was wrongfooted by earlier diagnostics. It had been clear since the late 1920s that 
international law could have direct effect; the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) had 
said as much in its Courts of Danzig opinion, stipulating only that as a matter of international law, 
such depended on the intentions of states. If states so desire, their agreements might be directly 
effective in domestic legal orders.21 But the Courts of Danzig opinion still entailed that direct effect 
was, so to speak, rather indirect, mediated by states, and requiring implementation by states of 
more or less monist persuasion. Increasingly though, this seemed rather cumbersome and 
artificial, with business transactions taking place across boundaries, with human rights being 
promulgated, with international organizations producing norms aimed at affecting the individual 
(who else would international labour conventions or international health regulations be meant 
for?), and especially with the creation of the European Communities. These were clearly part of 
international law, in some respects, and equally clearly distinct from international law, as the 
European Court of Justice was quick to recognize.22 Hence, the contours of a new landscape 
became vaguely discernible by the mid-1950s, a landscape immortalized by Philip C. Jessup under 
the heading of “transnational law”.23  
Transnational law and global governance are different concepts,24 with different focal points and 
different points of emphasis, but both spring from the same core observation. They start from the 
position that the old, classic, nineteenth century system of international law, built around states, 
making law for states, affecting states and states only, through a handful of generally recognized 
types of legal source or instrument, no longer holds. This nineteenth century system culminated in 
the authoritative list of sources contained in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and before it of the PCIJ. It lingers on like the smile of the Cheshire cat, longer after 
the cat itself has disappeared from view. 
To be sure, traditional sources doctrine, exemplified by Article 38 ICJ Statute, is still heuristically 
useful, a fine starting point for a discussion on the way law is made in international society – that 
discussion has to start somewhere, after all. But it was probably never meant as an exhaustive list 
of how law could be made, and if it was intended to be exhaustive, then it was neither persuasive 
nor successful. As a starting point for a conversation, Article 38 is fine. As a description aiming 
                                                        
17 Baxter, ‘International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”’, (1980) 29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 549. 
18 Schachter, ‘The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements’, (1977) 71 American Journal of 
International Law, 296. 
19 S. Neff, Friends but No Allies (1990), 145-6. 
20 M. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy (1990) 214. 
21 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, advisory opinion, [1928] Publ. PCIJ, Series B, no. 15. 
22 Case 26/62, Van Gend and Loos v Netherlands Internal Revenue Administration, [1963] ECR 1. 
23 Ph.C. Jessup, Transnational Law (1956). 
24 N. Walker, Intimations of Global Law (2015). 
 
 
accurately to reflect the ways in which international law is made or where international law 
springs from, however, it is hopelessly inadequate, and there is something mildly alienating about 
attempting to squeeze all exercises of authority into three boxes: that of the treaty, that of 
custom, and that of the general principles of law. 
The problem here is not solely one of descriptive accuracy, although it is that too. Without 
denying the possibility that, e.g., resolutions of the General Assembly may come to form the basis 
of a later treaty (think of the Genocide Convention) or come to pass into customary international 
law (as happened with quite a few of the rights first promulgated in the Universal Declaration25), it 
is nonetheless obvious that the normative output of international organizations, for instance, can 
only be squeezed into these boxes with great difficulty. It does an injustice to think of the WHO’s 
International Health Regulations as if it were a treaty, and part of the injustice resides in the 
circumstance that a major player in their development was the WHO itself. It is even far more 
difficult to think of other instruments in terms of the recognized sources: surely, a handbook on 
visa processing produced by the International Organization for Migration aims to exercise and 
does in fact exercise great authority, but is neither treaty nor custom nor general principle. The 
loan agreements of the IMF; directives in European Union law; standards promulgated by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, or decisions by the World Health Organization to declare 
a health pandemic – all of them can perhaps be squeezed into the boxes made available by Article 
38 (as instruments derived from treaties, or reflecting some general practice or general principle 
or other), but none of them fits there comfortably. And even then, what to do with OSCE 
recommendations, with no treaty but an ostensibly “politically binding” document as their basis? 
Or the Basel Guidelines on Banking Supervision, neither emanating from a “proper” international 
organization nor based on a “proper” treaty, but widely expected to have real-life effects of great 
authority? Or the communiqués of the G20, to which much the same applies? Or the Accord on 
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, involving companies (or brands, rather) and trade 
unions?26 It is clear that all these represent attempts at recording agreement and exercising 
authority on the international level, but the traditional vocabulary and the traditional conceptual 
apparatus with which international lawyers are equipped is insufficient for a proper 
understanding. Inventing new labels might help, but only if those labels themselves are sufficiently 
clear, and that has never been the case with labels such as “soft law”. Instead, the label “soft law” 
likely made things worse, by suggesting a veneer of understanding where none was present, and 
in the process diluting the idea of law as something that can come in varying shades of 
bindingness and providing authorities with unlimited license to rule.27 
But, as noted, there is more to it than merely descriptive accuracy. Legal rules, of whatever 
provenance, typically allocate costs and benefits, whether tangible or intangible. Whenever a new 
rule is enacted, someone benefits or profits, and this applies even to coordination rules, of which 
it is often said that contents are irrelevant as long as they coordinate.28 It may be that for the 
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individual motorist it is indeed irrelevant whether one should drive on the right hand side or the 
left hand side of the road, as long as everyone does the same. However, the car manufacturer who 
does not take note of a change in the rule will run the risk of losing a significant share of the 
market.  
Likewise, legal decisions (and indeed authoritative decisions generally) tend to have distributive 
effects. When the WHO declares a health pandemic, those pharmaceutical companies whose 
vaccinations are marketable might make good money; those whose vaccinations are still in 
development lose out. A decision to admit Palestine or Kosovo as a full member to an 
international organization will not just be functionally helpful (although it may be that too), but 
will also endow Palestine or Kosovo with a certain measure of recognition, quite likely much to the 
chagrin of Israel or Serbia. These decisions, in other words, have consequences, whether one 
realizes it or not; someone will be better off (regardless of how “better off” is measured, or 
whether the benefit at stake is financial, or social, or anything else), and someone is likely to be 
worse off. Often such results may be unintended, and yet they may be deeply invasive.29 
Moreover, institutions are established precisely for distributive purposes.30 There is a deeply felt 
need to achieve a certain amount of fairness (again: however precisely conceptualized) in the 
distribution of costs and benefits, so much that this cannot be left to individuals, not even to those 
with Herculean capabilities. There is, after all, always a chance that Hercules’ nephew applies for 
something, or that his next door neighbour’s interests are at stake – setting up an institution then 
helps to take some of the unfairness out of the decision-making process, even if it is likely to result 
in structural biases of a different kind. And there are additional reasons why decisions of 
administrators are typically subject to review; or why decisions of lower judges can be contested 
on appeal – all of this plays a role in fine-tuning the allocation of costs and benefits. And the same 
logic helps explain why it is pointless to appeal to the outcomes of a lottery (presuming the lottery 
itself took place properly), or the sort of decision-making football coaches have to make when 
deciding who gets to play in which position in which match.31  
 
III. Global Governance: On Winners and Losers 
 
When international law was still thought to affect only states, without immediately affecting 
anyone else, none of this was considered very problematic. The free jostling of states would create 
an outcome, and it was obvious that the stronger states were expected to derive more benefits 
from the system than the weaker states. The invisible hand might keep the world spinning with 
some efficiency, but does little to guarantee fairness – something, incidentally, that Adam Smith 
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was all too aware of and tried to mitigate on the micro-level.32 In this classic system, political 
authority was deemed to be unproblematic, and it was deemed unproblematic precisely because 
the system was geared only towards states who, moreover, being sovereign and all that, would be 
perfectly at liberty to circumvent any unpleasant future obligations. Reality was considerably more 
resilient, as many in particular in the global south experienced, but the theory was neat: states 
would enter into obligations at their pleasure, upon approval by domestic audiences (the king, the 
politbureau, the parliament) or, just as likely, not at all. Either way, in terms of political obligation, 
in terms of political philosophy, the system was almost a closed circle: there was no strict need for 
domestic approval, as no domestic interests would be affected.33 Quod erat demonstrandum. 
The model was, quite obviously, untenable from the start, precisely because the state is an 
artificial person which, in an important sense, has no interests of its own. Governments (or rather, 
their members) may have interests, in that they may wish to be re-elected; companies (or rather, 
their owners) have interests, in that they may wish to make a profit; individuals may have an 
interest, in that they may wish to remain free from torture, earn a decent living, and see their 
holiday postcards delivered. But states are abstractions, to which of course abstract interests can 
be ascribed (survival, especially, or the rather hopelessly self-referential raison d’état), but whose 
own decisions and laws come to affect individuals – always and by definition. And when they make 
international law or apply international law, those interests of individuals will be affected, and that 
applies even to such inter-state activities as armed conflict. To say that war between states A and 
B is war between states A and B only on some inter-state level and does not, being international, 
affect the citizens of A and B is quite obviously nonsensical, and much the same applies on a 
different level of banality to, say, the activities of the Universal Postal Union (UPU). UPU may be 
an organization comprising 192 states, but it is clear that postcards and letters and packages are 
usually sent by individuals and companies rather than states – the idea that the UPU would merely 
apply on the inter-state level was always a fiction. Nothing could demonstrate this more plausibly 
than the US withdrawal from UPU announced in 2018 – and revoked in late 2019, after postal 
rates for US companies had been adjusted at an Extraordinary Congress, to the benefit of those US 
companies.34  
In a world largely made up of liberal ideals, several basic assumptions vie for prominence, and 
perhaps the most basic of those is that people should be free to determine their own political and 
social futures. This is not universally guaranteed, with many states being democratic in name only, 
and quite a few not even that, but political autonomy is widely regarded as a basic component of 
political and social life, and it is only the autonomous individual who can bear responsibility for his 
or her actions. There is much debate about this at the margins and on points of detail, but the 
core proposition would seem to be universally embraced: the social and political ideal is that of 
men and women who are free to determine their own trajectories in life. And to this end, in many 
democracies, parliaments were established (often after intense political battle, as the powers that 
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be typically want to remain in power); those parliaments would fight for their powers to be 
increased (until party politics made partisan positions more important) and the right to vote in a 
number of states steadily extended.35 
But this created a legitimacy deficit for international law. If domestic law would increasingly draw 
on having somehow been discussed and decided on by domestic constituencies, the same logic did 
not apply to international law. Democratic control over foreign policy was rare to begin with, and 
often deemed merely obstructive: domestic parliamentarians were considered ignorant of the 
finer details of geopolitics and national interests, and would interfere with the conclusion of high-
level deals which could be vital to the state.36 As long as international law could be presented as 
merely affecting states in their relations with each other, this was not considered to be too much 
of a problem; but when it became clear that international law started directly to affect the rights 
and obligations, the costs and benefits, of individuals, the question of its political justification 
inevitably arose. And international law was lost for words; it had no response – and still has no 
response - to those who complain about its absence of democratic pedigree. Decisions directly 
affecting your material interests are taken by governors you have not elected or helped to 
appoint, by means of instruments you have no influence over nor even, often enough, cognizance 
of, and often through institutions that are far removed from your daily experience - no wonder 
people are a little upset. 
 
IV. Azaria, Daugirdas, Chasapis Tassinis 
 
People may be (and are) upset, but the answer is not to be found in voting populist leaders into 
office, and the answer is not to be found in further technocracy either. Proposals by international 
bodies to fight populism by adopting resolutions against populism may provide Monty Python’s 
heirs with some material for sketches, but are unlikely to have any real effects – and are therewith 
as depressing as what causes them, or perhaps even more so. 
More to the point perhaps, neither is the answer to be found in fine-tuning sources doctrine, 
stretching our familiar boxes just a little to fit in additional instruments, or repackaging or re-
branding the boxes of treaty, custom, and general principles. It is on this point that the excellent 
articles, elsewhere in this issue, by Danae Azaria, Kristina Daugirdas and Orfeas Chasapis Tassinis, 
need to be scrutinized. 
Sources doctrine has always retained an air of mystery, despite having been around for well over a 
century (treaty and custom, after all, were discussed long before Article 38 saw the light). And yet, 
the important questions have always remained open, throughout the centuries: we still don’t 
know what a treaty is, we still don’t know what custom is, and we still don’t know what a general 
principle is, despite attempts to conceptualize and systematize.37 There are moments when we 
think we know, when matters seem relatively clear; but these moments tend to be fleeting. We 
                                                        
35 See, e.g., A.R. Myers, Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789 (1975). 
36 A typical statement from the early twentieth century (in Dutch) is A. Struycken, Het bestuur der buitenlandsche 
betrekkingen: een staatsrechtelijk en politiek vraagstuk (1918). 
37 J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (1996); A. d’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International 
Law (1971); Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (2006 [1953]). 
 
 
thought we knew what a treaty was when in 1950 Hersch Lauterpacht offered a definition, for 
purposes of the future Vienna Convention. As it turned out though, this very definition, by 
defining the treaty an instrument intended to create legal rights and obligations, opened the door 
for instruments intended to create rights and obligations that would be non-legal. After all, if it 
takes an intention to create a legal instrument, then it may also be possible to intend not to create 
a legal instrument.38 And we thought we knew what custom was when the ICJ presented a 
sensible conceptualization in North Sea Continental Shelf,39 emphasizing that what matters was 
that putative rules must be of a “norm-creating character”. This turned out to be difficult with 
respect to rules that were normatively desirable but riddled with exceptions or whose application 
typically involves “balancing”, in particular human rights norms – these might be “norm-creating” 
in an abstract sense, but less so on the ground. And because it is difficult to think of human rights 
in terms of classic custom, the suggestion arose that if some practices did not meet the standards 
of custom, perhaps they could still be seen as general principles, turning the latter into “custom 
lite”.40 
From these fundamental anxieties followed a number of further anxieties, especially with respect 
to custom. The ICJ in Nicaragua was confronted with the question whether state practice consists 
of action on the ground or in the drawing room, and opted for the latter. Normatively this was 
understandable, and probably the right thing to do, but it did mean that customary law was no 
longer, well, based on actual practice. And other fundamental questions have never been 
answered, indeed have rarely even been asked: what, e.g., is the status of non-practice? Here, 
Chasapis Tassinis has an important point: custom demands interpretation, in all its stages, and 
that includes the interpretation (call it “framing”, if you will) of what counts as relevant practice 
for the formation of custom. Differently put, custom works on a curious binary basis, with practice 
divided into two groups: either relevant for the formation of a rule, or beside the point. But this 
ignores that practice itself is a fuzzy concept for any philosophy of action, mostly viewing only 
positive actions as relevant. Yet, every day Russia does not invade Finland may just as well be 
construed as contribution to the prohibition of aggression. And why count every day as a single 
instance? Perhaps the relevant unit should be the hour: every day Russia does not invade Finland 
counts as 24 bricks for the customary prohibition of aggression. The point is not to ridicule sources 
doctrine; the point is, instead, to emphasize that it has always been uncertain, and will most likely 
always remain uncertain. 
Partly this is caused by having to adapt over time. Sources need to be somewhat stable, 
generating as they do legal rights and obligations, but need also to be flexible enough to 
accommodate change. There can be a lot at stake here: being able to point to a recognized rule of 
international law in order to justify your behavior provides a strong argument, stronger than doing 
the same thing without the support of a recognized rule. Hence, sources doctrine is forever bound 
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to remain somewhat mysterious: for any mystery that will be unraveled, a new one will present 
itself, or, just as likely, the old one will return in a new guise. 
This is not necessarily a bad thing. The twin demands of change and stability conspire to view 
sources doctrine as a platform for much-needed political debate, and as long as it does not lapse 
into telling agents that actually, they have been under obligation to act differently for a long time 
without realizing it, the constant attention for sources doctrine can offer and streamline political 
breathing space. On such a view, sources are not just about taming politics, but also about 
facilitating politics – even though this requires considerable judgment as to when to tame, and 
when to facilitate. 
It is precisely with a view to the moment of choice (when to tame politics, and when to facilitate 
politics) that sources doctrine needs to be constantly and vigilantly undertaken, and with that in 
mind, the contributions by Chapasis Tassinis, Azaria and Daugirdas are to be welcomed. But the 
context should also make clear that sources doctrine is all the better and more convincing when 
informed by its political background and this, one senses, is not overwhelmingly present in their 
respective contributions. 
Azaria compellingly argues that instead of making international law, the International Law 
Commission has become predominantly an interpreter of existing international law, and the 
underlying idea would seem to be that it is a good thing to have an interpretive organ of such 
authority available. Azaria’s diagnostic is persuasive; her normative claim however somewhat less 
so, for surely, an ILC with this kind of authority comes close to being a legislator, without there 
being the intermediary step of the diplomatic conference to reconsider the work of the ILC. 
Pragmatically, there is much to be said for not submitting articles on state responsibility, or most 
other topics for that matter, to a diplomatic conference; but it does mean that power remains 
concentrated in the hands of the ILC – an organ of fairly little democratic pedigree, at best tapping 
into its professional expertise for legitimation of its practices.  
Moreover, one has to wonder whether it displays the characteristics one may hope for in a 
twenty-first century legislator, such as representativeness. On this point, the ILC will be found 
seriously wanting. Its members may “run for office” in a colloquial sense, but this consists mostly 
of campaigning capital cities and proposing vote trades: you vote for me, I’ll make sure we’ll vote 
for your candidate judge to the International Criminal Court, or will support your candidacy for a 
seat on the Peacebuilding Commission.41 Much the same is true for other bodies, but at least with 
other bodies there is either also a strong component of expertise involved over and above politics 
(as with the ICJ), or else they lack the sense of a-political authority Azaria wishes to ascribe to the 
ILC. By contrast, the ILC is composed of a fairly random selection of international lawyers, many of 
them with a Foreign Office background (rather than judicial or academic42). Moreover, it is clear 
that some states have very little interest in sponsoring an ILC member. The Netherlands, e.g., has 
provided three members since 1949 (Francois, Tammes and Riphagen), but none since 1986, when 
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Riphagen’s term ended. A large state such as Indonesia has provided only two (Kusuma-Atmadja 
and Wisnumurti), as has Sweden (Sandström and Jacobsson), while Belgium has not provided a 
single ILC member since the ILC started in 1949.43 Geographical representation apart, the ILC also 
does not have a terribly strong record on gender equality. Azaria sketches a compelling picture of 
the authority exercised by the ILC, but does not get around to the question why the authority of 
the ILC should be accepted.44 
Chasapis Tassinis likewise focuses on interpretation, but instead of assigning authority to interpret 
to a particular body, his focus rests on the role of interpretation with respect to customary 
international law. He makes the excellent point that interpretation pervades custom in all stages 
of its existence: one cannot think of custom without interpreting facts, or even without providing 
an interpretation of which facts are considered relevant to begin with. What is unclear, moreover, 
is how far his concept of “interpretation” reaches – it might reach farther than is responsible. 
Clearly, interpretation is meant as a methodological device, in much the same way as the relevant 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are meant as methodological devices, 
telling treaty interpreters what to do, although he sensibly remarks that the interpretation cannot 
be an investigation into authorial intent.45 But how far can that analogy be taken? Treaty 
interpreters are confronted with a written, and more or less (always “more or less”) complete 
text. Interpreters of custom, however, rarely have this luxury, and indeed that is part of the point 
Chasapis Tassinis makes. They first have to establish whether the thing they claim represents a 
customary rule does indeed represent such a rule, and this entails not just interpreting a written 
provision with a beginning and an ending, but also interpreting materials, some of which may not 
be written, and even interpreting underlying assumptions, which typically are not written to begin 
with. The process, quite literally, has no beginning and no end,46 rendering it extremely vulnerable 
to manipulation. Calling all of this “interpretation” may not be very helpful, even if it does involve 
interpretation. But the search for relevant materials involves more than only interpretation. 
Finally, Kristina Daugirdas makes an argument of a different nature, aiming to demonstrate that 
international organizations should be recognized as being able to contribute to the formation of 
customary international law. This complements an earlier article in which she argued that 
international organizations are bound by customary international law.47 Hence, it would seem to 
                                                        
43 For those who are into this sort of thing, Belgium may actually have the last laugh here, in that it provides a 
disproportionate share of the registrars of the ICJ and other international courts and tribunals – and one might well 
argue that a tribunal’s registrar is far more powerful than a member of the ILC. 
44 She does suggest that authoritative interpretation can be seen as part of the ILC’s mandate, but that merely shifts 
the problem: is the mandate of the ILC, devised over 70 years ago, still credible as a justification for the exercise of 
authority? 
45 Whether these are successful, or even can be successful, is a different matter: see Klabbers, ‘Virtuous 
Interpretation’, in M. Fitzmaurice et al. (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Thirty Years On (2010) 17. 
46 It is in part for this reason that the Vienna Convention is reluctant to promote resort to a treaty’s travaux 
préparatoires: it would provoke all sorts of discussion as to which materials are part of the travaux, and which are not. 
See further Klabbers, ‘International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty 
Interpretation?, (2003) 50 Netherlands International Law Review, 267. 
47 Daugirdas, ’How and Why International Law Binds International Organizations’, (2016) 57 Harvard International Law 
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follow that they should also be able to contribute to customary international law, and within the 
four corners of her article, she does indeed make a persuasive case. There is no prohibition in 
international law preventing organizations from contributing to customary international law, and 
doctrines concerning implied and inherent powers can be stretched so as to encompass a power 
to participate in the formation of customary international law. One caveat, seemingly ignored by 
Daugirdas, is in order though: in its Namibia opinion, the ICJ rather carefully suggested the 
possibility of there being a practice of the United Nations relating to voting in the Security Council. 
The Court avoided using the vocabulary of customary international law, and it might be useful to 
make a mental note to the effect that the practices of a particular organ are first and foremost 
practices of that organ. Indeed, more generally (as discussions concerning the formulation of the 
Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations amply illustrate48), unlike states, 
organizations tend be very different from each other, and are supposed to be limited to acting 
within a given function or set of functions. 
What does Daugirdas’ position entail? It entails, as Daugirdas suggests, that organizations can help 
to make custom relating to their own position, most notably perhaps concerning their own 
privileges and immunities. The relevance hereof should not be exaggerated though: privileges and 
immunities tend to be negotiated or calibrated on a case-by-case basis, so there is little need for a 
customary basis and, in reality, not much reliance either. An organization may perhaps claim that 
on the basis of customary international law, it would be entitled to privileges and immunities; but 
the precise level of that organization’s privileges and immunities remains subject to negotiation.49 
It will also entail that organizations can contribute to the formation of customary international law 
if and when they act on a par with states. Daugirdas provides examples relating to the exercise of 
territorial administration (where arguably practice is too scarce to speak of custom50); the 
promulgation of existing norms (again, it is doubtful whether custom is the best label here), and 
the practice of organizations as treaty depositaries. The latter is no doubt accurate: to the extent 
that there is customary international law relating to the role and functions of the depositary, it will 
have been built in part on the practices of the UN, the Council of Europe, and other international 
organizations. 
Perhaps the most significant indirect consequence of organizations’ contribution to custom is that 
”international organizations are certainly bound by the customary international law rules that they 
help to create.”51 That may be so, but immediately raises the legitimacy question. Presuming 
Daugirdas is correct in her conclusion here (as she may well be), the net result is that international 
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48 See e.g. quite a few of the contributions to M. Ragazzi, Responsibility of International Organizations: Essays in 
Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie (2013). 
49 Note also that even rules on privileges and immunities have distributive effects and come with opportunity costs, 
meaning that local authorities will not always wish to be very generous: any dollar earned but not taxed means less 
money for public projects, and any illegally parked diplomatic car usurps space for local citizens. 
50 There is moreover, again, the potential problem of abstraction: it may well become a customary rule that territorial 
administration announces to respect specified human rights norms, but that alone says little about which precise 
norms, and in which precise formulation. 
51 Daugirdas, ms, at 42. 
 
 
law is (partly) made by entities without any democratic pedigree. That may not be terribly 
dramatic when it concerns the tasks of treaty depositaries, but becomes already considerably 
more serious if, as she suggests, international organizations, when exercising territorial 
administration, may also contribute to human rights law. And this would typically involve 
strengthening some existing norms, while ignoring or overruling others.52 This may not be much of 
a practical issue when those organizations do morally good work, but that is something that can 
no longer be taken for granted – and probably never could.53 In this connection, it may also be 
worth noting that organizations, as a general rule, have no standing before international tribunals, 
and are shielded from scrutiny by domestic courts. Hence, embracing the idea of organizations as 
making customary international law effectively creates undemocratic law-makers whose acts 
cannot be reviewed. Surely, few can deem this a desirable state of affairs. 
In the end, Daugirdas’ argument makes sense only against the background of the epistemic 
assumption that international organizations are inherently benign, turning the proverbial swords 
into the equally proverbial plowshares.54 For it is only on the basis of such an assumption that law-
making by unelected and unaccountable entities can be considered pragmatically acceptable, and 
even then only on the further assumption (topos is perhaps a better label) that the end justifies 
the means.55 Surely though, claiming that the end justifies the means is little more than a 
consequentialist conceit and, of more immediate concern, the assumption that international 
organizations are inherently benign, while a popular staple of thinking about international 
organizations, is no longer plausible. Strongly put, quite a few international organizations are little 
more than organized lobbies (either for their member states or other constituencies), and even 
the most “technical” international organizations take decisions that have distributive effects: they 
benefit some, at the expense of others, and are thus not inherently benign.56  
 
V. To Conclude  
 
Much is written these days about a crisis in international law, a crisis in global governance, with US 
President Trump and other authoritarian leaders presented as populists, aiming to undermine 
international law, aiming to undermine multilateralism, appealing to baser parochial, nationalist 
sentiments. Accurate as this may be, it sometimes suffers from selection bias and hyperbole57 and, 
more importantly, the proper response cannot be to offer more of the same. International law 
cannot be saved by adopting a resolution calling upon the world to save international law; it 
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humanitarian mandate, such as the International Organization for Migration? On the latter, see Klabbers, ‘Notes on 
the Ideology of International Organizations Law: The International Organization for Migration, State-making, and the 
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cannot be saved by a treaty against populism. And neither can it be saved by entrusting 
interpretation to the ILC, or by allowing international organizations to participate in the making of 
customary international law, or even by realizing, however accurately, that custom too requires 
interpretation, and does so at many stages. 
To be fair, the contributions by Azaria, Daugirdas and Chasapis Tassinis, blissfully, do not promise 
the salvation of international law; they know better. They remain content by taking on large 
questions in relatively small doses, but there is a risk in doing this, and in the preceding pages I 
have aimed to articulate my unease. That unease is perhaps best summed up by suggesting that 
work on the boundary of political theory and international law (and things can hardly get closer to 
that boundary than when talking about law-making and authority) is at its best when sensitive to 
political theory. I think Azaria is absolutely right in demonstrating that the ILC interprets 
international law, and even in claiming that “nothing inherent in ‘interpretation’ restricts the 
Commission from interpreting.”58 Likewise, Daugirdas demonstrates that international 
organizations can contribute to some customary international law, while Chasapis Tassinis 
persuasively posits that custom too generates issues related to interpretation. My problem is not 
with any of their diagnoses – they are, by and large, compelling. My problem, instead, is with the 
underlying sentiment that leaving matters to the ILC or to international organizations or to 
whoever gets to interpret, might be a good thing. For it is this sentiment, pervasive in much 
doctrinal work on the sources of international law, that straddles the boundary with political 
theory or political philosophy - that cannot but touch on the pros and cons of various forms of 
exercising political authority.  
The broader point is perhaps best seen as a matter of professional awareness, or the faculty of 
judgment – Aristotelian phronesis. The academic international lawyer must, obviously, be 
technically competent, and this Azaria, Chasapis Tassinis and Daugirdas are. But in making 
technically competent arguments, the academic (there are different considerations relating to the 
barrister or litigator or government lawyer59) should ideally also keep an eye out for the 
assumptions on which their work is based, and the possible ramifications of the arguments that 
they so ably arrive at. And when writing about the making of international law, such would entail 
keeping an eye out for issues of democracy and accountability, and making sure that the work is 
built on solid foundations. In other settings, other sensibilities may enter the picture: the 
academic human rights lawyer arguing that waterboarding stops just short of constituting torture, 
or the academic investment lawyer suggesting that entire populations can be driven into 
starvation because “the law protects investments”, ought to demonstrate an awareness that their 
arguments will affect people of flesh and blood. But when it comes to discussing issues of 
international law-making, some sensibility for such things as democracy, representation, 
participation and the like on the part of the academic international lawyer would not be amiss. 
After all, no matter how technically brilliant our arguments and analyses, at the end of the day the 
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law is about people of flesh and blood, and it stands to reason to suggest that their fates are not 
decided on the basis of superbly crafted legal arguments alone. 
